This paper examines the linkages between the Russian stock market and those of its largest neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe, and the world stock markets over the 10 year period 1995-2004. What we find is that there was a major change in the nature of these relationships after the so called Russian Crisis of 1997-1998. The nature of this change is such that we can no longer rely on the the traditional methods used to examine linkages between equity markets. Using a more appropriate set of tools we find that the major influences on the Russian stock market have become the equity markets of the European Union and the USA. There is very little evidence of influence from (or to) regional markets such as Poland or Hungary.
Introduction
After the collapse of communist and socialist regimes at the beginning of 1990s, a number of Central and Eastern European (CEE) economies started their journey into capitalism by establishing private property and capital markets. As a result, a number of stock markets have been established in the region. Since then they displayed considerable growth in size and degree of sophistication.
CEE stock markets attracted interest of academics due to a number of reasons.
Firstly, these markets provided a possibility to re-examine existing asset pricing models and pricing anomalies in the conditions of the evolving markets. Market efficiency of the CEE markets is tested in Ratkovicova (1999) and Gilmore and McManus (2001) ; a version of CAPM is tested in Charemza and Majerowska (2000) ; Mateus (2004) explores the predictability of the European emerging market returns within an unconditional asset-pricing framework while the January pricing anomaly is studied in Henke (2003) .
Secondly, in the light of growing interdependencies between world equity markets due to enhanced capital movements, numerous studies investigated the extent to which emerging European stock markets are integrated with global markets, and the extent to which they are subjects to global shocks (Gelos and Sahay, 2000; Gilmor and McManus, 2002; Scheicher, 2001) . Among the CEE markets, those of the Vysegrad countries (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) have attracted most of the attention of the academics due to their economies faster growth relative to their regional counterparts (Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Croatia and Baltic countries), in addition to political stability and their (successfully realised) prospects of joining the European Union.
The repercussions of the Russian currency and debt crises for the world stock markets have been extensively discussed in the literature (see, among others, Baig and Goldfain, 2000; Gelos and Sahay, 2000; Hernández and Valdés, 2001; Dungley et al., 2003) . However, as far as we are aware, no studies have been done on linkages shared by this market after 1998. This lack of research is surprising. Firstly, Russia is the largest among the CEE stock markets in terms of market capitalization. Secondly, the Russian economy remains important for the Eastern European region.
Although trade links have declined significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia still remains an important trading partner for the Vysegrad countries, as well as a source of significant direct investment in the region (Jochum, Kirschgässner and Platek, 1998; UNCTAD, 2004a; 2004b; 2004c) . Thirdly, a number of studies have shown that the nature market linkages is time-varying (Bekaert and Harvey, 1995; . Gelos and Sahay (2000) suggest that "…the reaction of the more advanced financial markets in the region around the time of the Russian ruble collapse suggests that further financial market liberalization, … and integration may result in higher future financial market comovements". Thus the aim of the paper is to investigate and document the changing role of the Russian stock market for the CEE markets and to explore whether its importance for the regional markets has changed after the 1998 crisis. The paper also explores its linkages with the developed markets (US, UK, EMU and Japan), with a special emphasis on the post-crisis period.
Increasing integration of equity markets and capital markets in general can be expected to have three broad sets of implications if the integration spurs greater development of the financial sector (see Pagano, 1993) . First, the attractiveness of international portfolio diversification will weaken as returns are equalized across countries. Second, the more complete are the world's capital market, the more robust will be the economies of individual states. Third, household savings rates will consequently change over time. The former two outcomes are in general seen to have positive effects on economic growth while the latter is more uncertain.
International portfolio diversification is justified only if there are gains from it. With increasing integration of international equity markets, the diversification benefits will tend to decline as the correlations become increasingly positive and strengthen. This concept has been well known for at least several centuries, and has been quantified and modeled since at least the early years of the 20 th century. Goetzmann et al. (2002) demonstrate, using over 150 years of capital market history that a few key facts keep emerging. First, the periods when diversification benefits tend to be of the highest potential (with low correlations between international indices) tend also to be periods that present investors with the greatest difficulty in diversifying. These tend to be periods of war and significant international tension. Second, the periods that have the highest correlations (and thus the lowest diversification benefits) are during the turn of the 19 th century, during the Great Depression, and during the late 20 th century, -which tend to be periods when markets are generally bearish in tendency. Thus, the third finding that diversification benefits are non-constant and may be least available when they are most needed. Interestingly, it is not clear why these shifts in correlations and linkages occur over the long run. Roll (1992) proposes Ricardian specialization, Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994) suggest that national cultures and economic predilections dominate industrial explanations, while Chen and Knez (1995) and Korajczyk (1996) suggest that lack of integration drives the issue, without addressing why this integration has not occurred.
The structure of the paper is the following. The next section presents literature review on the linkages displayed by Russian stock market. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the development of the Russian stock markets since its re-establishment in 1991, including the events of the Russian crisis of August 1998 and its implications for the Russian stock market. Section 4 presents data and methodology used in the study. Section 5 discusses empirical results and Section 6 provides conclusions.
Russian equity market integration
Studies that shed light on comovements of Russian and international stock prices are not plentiful and usually they analyze Russia along with other CEE markets. The conclusions of these studies do not necessarily conform to each other, due to differences in sample period, data frequency, stock market indices used and adjustment procedures applied to the indices used.
Probably one of the earliest studies is that of Linne (1998) . This study sought to investigate whether newly established Eastern European markets (Russia, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic) display any long-relationships within the group, and with mature markets (Germany, UK, France, Italy, Switzerland, US and Japan). The data set consisted of local stock market indices expressed in US dollars, at weekly frequency, over the period from 1991 to 1997.
The results suggest that during the sample period none of the two most important Russian stock market indices displayed linkages with any of the analyzed markets. Among the CEE markets only Poland displayed comovements with the world portfolio proxied by the MSCI-World index. By contrast, the Slovakian stock market showed cointegration relations with all mature stock markets.
The author concludes that at that period CEE markets were mostly driven by the domestic factors.
The paper, however, does not attempt to provide explanations of the country-specific patterns of the long-run linkages.
Röckinger and Urga (2001) explored integration of the four emerging stock markets over the period from 1994 to 1997 using an extended Bekaert and Harvey (1997) model for conditional volatility with time varying parameters. Apart from valuable information about the extent and strength of financial integration provided by the time varying parameters, the advantages of this approach are the following. Firstly, accounting for GARCH structure of the residuals, it allows to establish the nature of the GARCH effect in case of the emerging markets (leverage vs. liquidity hypotheses). Secondly, the model incorporates a latent factor, which accounts for information beyond stock market indices. The study uses daily data for the most important local stock market indices expressed in US dollars. The results suggest that Russian stock market differs from the other three markets with regard to sources of shocks spillovers. United States and Germany are important sources of shock spillovers in case of Russia. Czech and Polish stock returns seem to reflect movements in the UK and not in the US. Both Czech and Hungarian stock returns were mostly influenced by German market movements, although in case of Hungary the impact has declined, whereas for Czech Republic it increased. The paper, however, does not comment on the importance of regional shocks for the CEE countries.
Jochum, Kirschgässner and Platek (1998) (JKP) pointed out the importance of political and economic events in Russia for CEE economies (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). As an example, although by the end of 1997 CEE markets had largely recovered from the losses incurred due to Asian crisis, they underwent further losses as domestic Russian economic conditions worsened over the first half of 1998. Therefore in their analysis the authors take into account the timing of events in Russia when analyzing the impact of the crisis on the extent of predictability and co-movements between CEE markets and between these markets and the US stock market.
Assuming a time-varying pattern of market comovements, JKP distinguish between pre-crisis and crisis periods. Basing on the results of the principal component analysis and Hansen and Johansen (1993) tests of the constancy of cointegration vector, they set the latter from 1 September 1997 to 21 September 1998. They find considerable differences both in short-term and long-term linkages between the markets. In line with the evidence for developed markets (Longin and Solnik, 1995) they find significant increase in the values of daily correlations during the crisis period between market returns and absence of cointegration vectors for any of the markets. Before the crisis period the Russian stock market shared bivariate cointegration relations with Hungarian and the US markets, which are no longer detected in the crisis period. JKP explain the absence of cointegration after the crisis by the dominance of the short-run adjustments over the long-run dynamics. Results of the variance decomposition show that before the crisis 95 % per cent of the variance in the Russian stock market was explained by itself after 5 days. During the crisis period the share of foreign markets in explaining variance increased from 5% to 20 %. In both periods most of the impact was due to movements in US markets, with the Polish stock market exerting the smallest impact on fluctuations in the Russian stock market. Fedorov and Sarkissian (2000) examine the issue of integration at the industry level, finding the not surprising result that integration with the world market proxy is greater the larger and more internationally orientated (through trade) is the typical industry firm.
The Russian stock markets
Since published literature on emerging European stock markets usually analyses Russia along with a number of CEE countries, it does not provide much information the organization and development of the Russian stock market. This section aims to fill this gap, focusing in more detail on Russian stock market. (Grigoriev and Valitova, 2002) . Moscow Stock Exchange was traditionally a market for shares of Gazprom -the Russian gas monopoly. There are also a number of regional stock exchanges, however their share in stock trading is negligible in comparison with those of MICEX and RTS (see Appendix A for details). Grigoriev and Valitova (2002) for the analysis of the relationship between RTS and MICEX indices as well as impact of oil and gas prices on their dynamics.
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Development of the Russian stock market
Crises of 1997-1998 and the Russian Stock Market
The crisis in Russian financial markets of 1997-1998 is usually divided into the three periods:
October 1997 -January 1998, March -May 1998 and July -August 1998 (IET, 1999; FCS, 1999) .
During the period to October 1997 RTS was characterized by an increase in trading volume and number of the participants, and the RTS Index displayed an impressive 94 % growth. However, positive tendencies in the stock market were taking place against the background of poor . We use MSCI indices as they are designed to be directly comparable across national exchanges, compiled on a value-weighted basis of freely investible shares. As such they represent here a dataset that is significantly different to the most of the previous studies and are we believe more directly comparable than those used by other studies. Shown in Table 3 are the basic descriptive statistics of the returns of the indices, and in Table 4 the correlation matrix of the returns data. All data in the sample are found to be I(1) in levels of the indices and I(0) in returns using conventional unit root testing procedures of Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron.
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Methodology
Johansen Cointegration Tests and VECM Modeling
We are concerned to capture in any modeling both the short run and the long run relationships that may arise. We initially examine the data for cointegration under the Johansen approach. Where we find cointegrating vectors, the parameters of these vectors are then set as constraints in a Vector
Error Cointegration Model. This allows us to derive, while addressing long-run equilibrium relations, the short-run dynamics of the system using impulse response functions (IRF's) and Variance Decomposition Analysis (VDA) . We analyze the data in the entire period (December 31, 1994 -October 14, 2004 , and in three sub-periods: before 1997, during the 1997-1998 crises period, and from 1999 onward. Thus we first separate crisis and tranquil periods by exogenously defining the duration of these periods, relaying on the market events described in Section 3.2. Since imposing the break dates exogenously may not necessarily reflect the true dynamics of the adjustment process, we proceed with the methodology that allows to estimate the break dates from the data, Gregory-Hansen Residual Based cointegration test.
Gregory -Hansen (1996) Residual Based Cointegration Test
Results of Monte Carlo experiments (Campos, Ericcson, and Hendry, 1996; Gregory and Hansen, 1996) show that when a shift in parameters takes place standard tests for cointegration (like the one of Engle-Granger, 1987) 
The second model accommodating a trend in data also restricts shift only to the change in level with a trend (C/T):
The most general specification allows for changes both in the intercept and slope of the cointegration vector (R/S):
The dummy variable, which captures the structural change, is represented as:
where
is a relative timing of the change point. The trimming interval is usually taken to be (0.15n, 0.08n), as recommended in Andrews (1993) . The models (1)- (3) 
DCC-GARCH Approach
We also use the recent Dynamic Conditional Correlation specification of Multivariate GARCH models (Engle, 2002) to model the main series for which we find significant relationships. Unlike the previous methodologies we analyze the multivariate relationships using returns of the indices.
Arising from the Gregory-Hansen and the Johansen-Juselius approach we identify the variables that are related in longterm equilibrium and then model these using the multivariate GARCH model. We use a parsimonious approach, describing the mean and variances as both ARMA(1,1) processes. This is strictly ad-hoc. The data are modeled as a DCC-GARCH(1,1) process, within a four variable system. The major advantage of this formulation is that while it preserves the main features of standard multivariate GARCH models it allows for explicit time variation in the conditional covariance (and correlation) matrix. The extraction of the conditional time varying correlations allows us to examine the short-run dynamics of the series that are linked by a long-run relationship.
It also allows to trace the effects attributed to the sequence of crisis events that took place throughout the sample.
Results
We examine the data over the entire period and over three sub periods as shown above. We use two techniques, as discussed, the Johansen multivariate method and the Gregory-Hansen approach.
We show the results for the Johansen approach in Table 5 and the Gregory-Hansen approach in Table 6, Table 7, and Table 8 . We show in Table 9 the variance decomposition for the four periods.
Two distinctly different stories emerge from these methods.
Johansen multivariate cointegration test, VARs and IRFs results
A number of features arise from a Johansen analysis over the entire period (Table 5) Having found no long-term relationship, we proceed to a Vector Autoregression without the need to impose error correction terms. We order the data based on the contemporaneous correlation between the equity indices, giving the ordering shown. Based on Block Exclusion tests we find that all variables apart from EMU and Czech Republic (CZ) have an impact on Russia. An examination of the residual correlation matrix indicates that there is strong remaining correlation between the variables, and thus while Impulse Response Functions (IRF) can be derived we cannot, except in the case of Russia-Japan, ascribe the resulting shocks to the perturbed series. For the Japan (JP) case we find that a positive shock in Japan leads to a rapid and sustained drop in the Russian market return of .4%.
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Examining the pre-crisis period, December 1994 -December 1996, we again find no long-run relationship present in the data, again indicating that over that period there would have been diversification benefits from investing in the area (see Table 5 ). There is a different order implied in the VAR model than that for the overall period. In common with the findings for the entire period, we find, based on block exogeneity tests, that all series apart from EMU and CZ have an impact on Russia.
Apart from Poland the residuals are uncorrelated with the Russian market, and so we can examine IRF's. The evidence from the IRF's is mixed with regard to the markets. Local CEE markets provide little stimulus to the Russian market, while it responds strongly positively to rises in US and EMU markets and falls against UK and Japanese markets.
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During the period around the Russian and Asian crises, defined as 1997-1998 here, we find emerging some evidence of long-run relationships (see Table 5 ). During the crisis period we find a single cointegrating vector, between Russia and Japan, emerging. This provides some evidence of weak international integration. However, after the crisis period, while there is increased evidence of integration, with two cointegrating vectors, Russia is not bivariatly correlated with any of the other variables. Again we find that all variables, apart from the Czech and EMU, have a significant impact on Russia. The strong correlations evident between the majority of the variables, apart from RU-JP and RU-CZ, renders interpretation of the IRF's uncertain. Again, the response to the Japanese market is negative, consistently overall, while the response to the EMU is mixed, starting negative and then rising to end positive. The evidence is that, consistently, the Russian market responds negatively to shocks in the Japanese and positively to shocks from the USA with mixed responses to UK and EMU markets and negligible responses to local markets (Poland, Czech and Hungary).
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Therefore the evidence from Johansen cointegration tests suggests that the Russian equity market remains segmented from the world equity markets. With the exception of the crisis period there was and remains a benefit to international diversification by including holdings of Russian equities for the investors of the other countries examined. Even within a VAR system we find that the market has remained relatively isolated. In particular, Russian equities remain segmented from the EMU markets.
Gregory-Hansen test results
Turning however to the Gregory-Hansen approach, we find a different situation as regards longrun relationships. For the Russian market the test indicates the presence of a number of bivariate cointegration relations with major markets. In particular, we find that the Russian market was cointegrated with the EMU, UK and USA, albeit with a break in the relationship. In the multivariate setting break is found in the cointegration vector for Russia and two groups of the developed markets (including and excluding Japan). Overall we find a number of unique breakpoints. These are all in the period June-August 1998, corresponding exactly to the etiology of the crisis. The breaks detected were 01/06/98, 02/06/98, 08/06/98, 06/07/98, 09/07/98, 11/08/98.
The final break point was therefore set at 31/7/98, to allow for the gradual adjustment. These results lead us to suggest that despite the serious impact on world markets of the Asian crisis of 1997 we find no evidence here that this crisis had an immediate effect on the stability of relationships between Russia and developed or regional markets.
Using 31/7/98 as the breakpoint in Table 7 and Table 8 we show the results of further GregoryHansen analyses. In the 'pre-crisis' period, up to 31/7/98, we find no evidence of bivariate cointegration relations between the Russian market and any other market or group of markets (Table 7) . This corresponds to the results of Johansen cointegration tests showing that the Russian stock market remained isolated until 1997. In the 'post-crisis' period, defined relaying on Gregory-
Hansen test results as 01/08/98 -14/10/04, we find evidence of bivariate cointegration relations for all four developed markets, again however with a break (Table 8 ). This break holds both individually and as a group. In the multivariate setting break is found in the cointegration vector for Russia and two groups of the developed markets (including and excluding Japan). We also find, for the first time, some evidence of increased integration with regional economies, the Gregory-Hansen techniques showing evidence in favour of cointegration with Poland, and very weak evidence for cointegration with Hungary. Therefore Gregory-Hansen test results strengthen weak evidence in favor of increased integration of the Russian stock market provided by the Johansen tests. The test suggest that the long-run market co-movements has strengthened after the major crisis events in the Russian economy have taken place; the test thus indicates the importance of the Russian crisis for the dynamics of the long-run relationships between the Russian and developed stock markets.
DCC-GARCH results
Whether the pattern of the short-run interdependencies between the Russian and major developed markets has been affected in a similar manner is examined by means of the DCC-GARCH model. The correlations are derived from a quadrivariate ARMA(1,1)-DCC-GARCH (1,1) model estimated over the 1995-2001 period. Shown in Figure 6 are the estimated daily conditional correlations between Russia and the main developed markets. 
Variance Decomposition results
Shown in Table 9 are variance decompositions, showing the percentage of forecast errors, over a 10-day period, that are attributable to each series. The table reports results using exogenous break point to separate crisis period. However, the results using the break points suggested by GregoryHansen approach lead to the same conclusions.
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An interesting feature that emerges from Table 9 is the changing role of the EMU markets as a source of volatility of the Russian stock market. Whereas movements in the European markets played an important role for the Russian stock market during the crisis, their importance dropped significantly afterwards, therefore leaving the USA a dominant source of influence on the Russian market, albeit the dominance of the latter has also fallen post crisis. During the crisis another dominant market appeared to be the Japanese one. Post-crisis, we find that shocks in EMU or local markets play little role in determining changes in the Russian market.
Conclusion
We have examined the relationship between Russian, developed markets, and other Central and Response of RU to EMU Response of RU to UK Response of RU to US Table shows the results of a Johansen-Juselius Multivariate cointegration test . Null hypothesis is that of a specificed or maxiumum number of cointegrating relationships (trace and max statistics respectively) ***, **, * -denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively Model specifications for the bivariate cointegration relationship: C -level shift (change in constant); C/T -level shift with trend (model with a linear trend and change in constant only); C/S -regime shift (model with change in both constant and slope). Critical values are taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996) . ***, **, * -denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively. Model specifications for the bivariate cointegration relationship: C -level shift (change in constant); C/T -level shift with trend (model with a linear trend and change in constant only); C/S -regime shift (model with change in both constant and slope). Critical values are taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996) . ***, **, * -denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively Model specifications for the bivariate cointegration relationship: C -level shift (change in constant); C/T -level shift with trend (model with a linear trend and change in constant only); C/S -regime shift (model with change in both constant and slope). Critical values are taken from Gregory and Hansen (1996) . ***, **, * -denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10 % levels respectively 
